ARLINGTON, Virginia ─ The United States and its Navy are at a historical inflection point similar to ones it experienced in the past, and service officials and planners should respond the same way officials did then, said the Navy’s relatively new chief of naval operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti.

Speaking Jan. 8 to the Surface Navy Association’s annual conference, Franchetti said the situation of the U.S. now is similar what was going on in the 1930s and 1970s. In both cases, visionary service leaders in peacetime looked ahead and prepared for war and built a Navy that was up to the task.

“I consider the 1930s and the 1970s as two decisive decades that sort of rhyme, in key ways, with where we are today,” she said. “… There are historical parallels that offer key lessons for us today.”

In the 1930s, the United States was still reeling from the Great Depression and had a shrinking shipbuilding base.

Fleet planners, their eyes on the threat from Imperial Japan, conducted a series of maneuvers, called fleet problems, to provide realistic training for Sailors. Planners also conducted extensive wargames. That let to a series of war plans that prompted the move from a fleet based on World War I battleships to a more integrated force that included aircraft carriers, dive bombers and torpedo bombers, all of which proved vital in World War II.

Ninety-five percent of the ships that fought in the war, including at the battles of Coral Sea and Midway, and in the Guadalcanal campaign, were fought with ships born from peacetime work.

“How we fight determines what we fight with. Warfighting concepts must drive the design of our warfighting platforms, our capabilities and our strategies,” Franchetti said.

In the 1970s, the Navy was a power projection force focused on supporting land troops in Asia amid a limited defense budget and high inflation. The nation had a hollowed-out shipbuilding industry and ended up with an aging fleet unprepared for escalating maritime competition from the Soviet Union.

Navy planners and leaders, including CNO Elmo Zumwalt and his successors, conceived of a fleet capable of global sea control, resulting in strategies that would “lay the intellectual groundwork” for the Navy’s weapons buys in the 1980s, which led to the introduction of the F/A-18 Hornet, the Los Angeles- and Ohio-class submarines, the Spruance and Arleigh Burke destroyers, Aegis, Harpoon and Tomahawk weapon systems, and others, she said.

Warfighting Lens

All of those systems were planned in peacetime but crucial when war came, Franchetti said, and the country is in a similar position now. She and other leaders are looking a new concepts, weapons and tactics through exercises and war games, as was done in the 1930s and 1970s, although now with advanced simulation technology.

“Today, our U.S. Navy is taking a similar approaching by viewing everything we do through a warfighting lens,” Franchetti said. “We have energized our wargaming enterprise at the Naval War College and at our Warfighting Development Center to empower leaders at all levels to think differently about how we need to operate in uncertain, complex and rapidly changing environments. Leaders who are ready to take initiative and be bold.”

The Navy is also undertaking fleet exercises and battle problems to develop and refine operational concepts to define the requirements for the future fleet, she said, including with Task Force 59, which has tested unmanned systems and other hardware and software in real-world situations.

“The actions taken during these respective decades remind us that we must be forward thinking in prioritizing our warfighting advantage, and that we must increase our capability and capacity in peacetime so we can be ready to surge effectively in war,” she said.

ARLINGTON, Virginia — The U.S. Navy must improve its workforce training, maintenance and surge capability to meet peer adversaries such as Russia and China, and is taking new steps to accomplish that goal, said Adm. Daryl Caudle, commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command.

Speaking at the Surface Navy Association’s 36th National Symposium, Caudle said today’s joint force was shaped by a two-decade land war following a sustained peace after the end of the Cold War, and military leaders are now trying to “get the rudder over” to a multi-domain, high-speed, long-range warfare against potential enemies such as Russia and China, or both together.

“When we need to turn the volume up quickly on delivering combat power, the hardest spigot I own is and will always be inextricably related to building and developing human capital — our most precious resource — our warriors,” he said.

Caudle said he is focusing on Contingency Response Forces, those required to be ready to flow for combat within 30 days. “This is where I am applying my efforts. Readiness cannot be left at the pier, delayed in the shipyard, or undelivered on a production line. Further, it can’t be driven by empty recruiting stations or empty repair lockers.”

The Navy’s current Optimized Fleet Response Plan, or OFRP, “was not built to generate combat ready ships and air wings to meet the demand signal against peer adversaries,” Caudle said. “During peacetime force generation, the OFRP provides a steady supply of ready naval forces for a wide range of global presence operations. But it is not optimized to shift into high gear and generate, deploy, and regenerate a large surge of combat ready maritime forces.”

To help with that surge, Caudle’s office is developing the Global Maritime Response Plan, intended to give the chief of naval operations “a way to shift the Navy from peacetime to wartime” by bolstering some key organizations within the service, combining others and devolving or shutting down lower-priority commands and functions. It will also include having shell contracts in place, ready to fill out and execute.

“The Global Maritime Response Plan development is well under way,” Caudle said. “We are currently building out the Decision Support Matrices and the Response Conditions, or RESCONs, [think like DEFCON] that will be used to control how our Navy will be put on the required warfighting footing level to best support operational commanders.”

In some cases, he said, the effort simply involves compiling and codifying plans already in place at Navy organizations.

Working with Industry

The defense industry has gained traction in getting armaments and supplies to the fleet, Caudle said, one year after chastising the industry for falling behind in meeting defense needs.

“Despite the significant challenges we face with long-lead time parts, shipyard delays, less than optimal living conditions during maintenance periods, and personnel shortages across many rates and NECs, you all are just crushing it,” Caudle told SNA attendees. At last year’s event, he delivered a blunt warning to industry that he wouldn’t tolerate ordnance delays blamed on COVID or supply chain issues.

“To be honest, after I spoke at SNA last year, I wasn’t so sure how my remarks would be received, and even more important, acted on by the defense industrial base,” he said. “After voicing my displeasure about our inability to produce and deliver ordnance on time and in sufficient quantity, complete maintenance availabilities with modernizations efforts on time and on cost, and the need to be at flank speed to improve productivity, efficiency and build rates from our public and private shipyards to deliver new construction and overhauled ships to our fleet … instead of an adverse reaction, I think it really struck a chord with industry leaders, leaders within the Department of Defense, and with many congressional members who see the problems I identified in the same way.”

Caudle said he has been impressed with how many industry partners have reached out to his office and Navy program managers to step up production “through improvements using a ‘Get Real, Get Better’ approach in which we embrace the red together, self-assess together, and correct identified challenges together. Truly assessing weak areas and shifting rudder hard over and revving the gas to get back on PIM [plan of intended movement].”

In a separate interview with media, Caudle said after last year’s speech he worked with Vice Adm. Francis Morley, the principal military deputy assistant secretary of the Navy (research, development and acquisition) to bring in industry leaders that build munitions such as the Standard Missile and anti-ship missiles to “actually hear their perspective on places where we as the government could help them.”
Some solutions include multi-year contracts, how the Navy works with industry on quality control tests and test equipment improvements that need to be done.

“I probably overstated some things and got educated on some things, and I think they understood that we need these weapons, and their motivation to do that at pace was illustrated to me in spades,” he said.

In his remarks this year, Caudle cautioned that “while we have made some gains since my remarks last year at SNA, I would argue that we have not achieved the level of readiness, production, and deliveries required in both capabilities and capacity to claim we are ‘up on plane’ with a winning trajectory. Make no mistake about it — we face formidable threats on the horizon. And, while the nature of war never truly changes, these threats are fundamentally changing the character of how we prepare our Navy to fight.”

ARLINGTON, Va. — Raytheon has completed the Technical Data Package for a sea mine destructor developed for the U.S. Navy as the test program continues, the company said in an interview with Seapower.

The Barracuda is a 26-pound, 48-inch-long anti-mine device housed in a tube the size of an A-size sonobuoy tube. When launched, the device is propelled by four small water jets that take the device to the datum of a suspected sea mine detected by the AQS-20C towed sonar. An acoustic communications data link buoy is released to which the device is tethered. Target updates, such as GPS coordinates, are transmitted to the device, which approaches the sea mine. A sonar and a camera mounted in the nose of the device enables a man-in-the-loop operator — for now — to confirm the mine. The device then is steered to the mine and detonated. Each Barracuda is a one-shot charge.

Since May 2023, Raytheon has been building 128 Barracudas for development, 63 for contractor trials and 65 for the Navy’s trials.

Dan Seamans, Raytheon’s director for mine warfare, including the AQS-20 sonar, the Airborne Mine Neutralization System, and the Barracuda at Portsmouth, Rhode Island, said the Navy has yet to finalize its decisions on what the launch platforms for the Barracuda will be. Candidates include the littoral combat ship’s mine-countermeasures mission package, including the Mine Countermeasures Uncrewed Surface Vessel. The company is building a surrogate launcher for the test program and will proceed to a tactical launcher.

The Navy awarded the initial design and development contract to Raytheon in 2018. The Navy’s spiral Critical Design Review of the Barracuda was completed in July 2023.

Low-Rate Initial Production for Barracuda is planned for fiscal 2027

By Bryan McGrath

The U.S. Navy is too small for what is asked of it, and what is asked of it is insufficient to meet the nation’s needs. We have too few ships, submarines, aircraft, aircraft carriers, people, sensors, weapons and networks. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) is growing faster than any navy has since the U.S. buildup to the Second World War, while the U.S. remains committed to efficient peacetime production levels that ignore the reality of this competition. Relative to the threats it faces, American naval power is weaker than at any time since the start of World War II. While the U.S. Navy remains the world’s most powerful seaborne combat force, not even the Soviet navy posed as dangerous a threat as China’s PLAN does today. The nature of that threat presents the prospect of a PLAN so powerful it could dominate the Western Pacific, destroying the legitimacy and effectiveness of America’s network of friends and allies by raising questions about America’s will and capability to support that network. The ability to dominate a region of the world responsible for 65% of global GDP represents a profound threat to U.S. national security and prosperity, and that of like-minded nations globally. A broad-based naval building program is required to meet China’s challenge and all elements of the modern, balanced fleet should expand. This essay focuses on the surface force, comprised of large surface combatants, small surface combatants and amphibious ships. For the purposes of this essay, critical surface platforms are excluded, but they are no less critical as a result. These include logistics ships, special mission ships, ocean-going tugs, sealift ships, tenders and the like. The surface force cannot operate without these other ships, and their importance to a coherent fleet design should not be discerned by their exclusion in this essay.

Navy Mission

The Navy shall be organized, trained and equipped for the peacetime promotion of the national security interests and prosperity of the United States and for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the duties described in the preceding sentence except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war. (10 USC Sec. 8062).

Members of the Navy League and readers of Seapower can be forgiven if this mission statement looks unfamiliar, as it has appeared in this form only since the passage of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in December 2022. Prior to this, Title 10 did not mention peacetime security interests or the promotion of American prosperity, functions the Navy has conducted since the earliest days of the republic. This disconnect between the Navy’s legal mission and what was routinely demanded of it was stark, and the sole focus on “… prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea” led to bureaucratic maneuvering inside the Pentagon by other services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense when Navy officials sought a fleet large enough to carry out both its wartime and peacetime roles. The answer to the additional capacity necessary for operations other than war often was reduced to “that is not your mission.” No more.

Congress is constitutionally obligated to “provide and maintain a Navy” (Art I Sec. 8) and the Navy is legally obligated to protect and promote the nation’s security and prosperity in peace and be prepared to fight and win in war. No element of the modern fleet is as central to these missions as the surface force, and that force must be properly resourced for the things that are asked of it.

Tasks of the Surface Force

The tasks of the surface force are the tasks of the Navy, and while the following list is not doctrine, it represents a solid foundation for discussion.
Conventional deterrence.

To deter aggression against American interests, the U.S. Navy must be able to control the seas and skies where it operates and project power from there. It must also be capable of denying control of the sea to others. A controlled sea is an unnatural condition; the seas are, and ought to be, free. Imposing and maintaining sea control is a function of conflict, and the ability to control the sea in order to project power is the Navy’s primary contribution to conventional deterrence. Lethal, networked, sustainable and forward-deployed surface ships are the linchpin of the nation’s forward-based efforts to promote security and prosperity, and they represent the vanguard of seapower that would turn immediately to Joint wartime operations should deterrence fail. One benefit of a strong deterrence posture is the assurance provided to allies and like-minded friends that the United States is a trusted local partner. Strategic (or nuclear) deterrence is a foundational task of the Navy, but it is the domain of the submarine force.

Crisis response

Crises occur where our interests lie, and those crises are both man-made and natural. Capable, flexible, available surface forces represent the humanity of the American people when disaster strikes or aggression flares. The forces we design and build for the delivery of violence are also forces of charity and relief, and they move from one role to the other without modification.

Naval diplomacy. This historic and critical task includes building partner capacity, assuring allies and friends, asserting U.S. rights and interests (including freedom of navigation), and exercising U.S. authority.

Warfighting. The Navy acts as the predominant maritime portion of the joint force in the waging and winning of war. It exercises sea control and sea denial to project power or to confound adversary power projection.

War termination. The Navy must prevent war, wage war and end war. The termination of war is a pursuit — especially at sea — that differs sufficiently from war-waging as to merit its own task, and it levies different demands upon the fleet architecture. Platforms and capabilities with less value in deterring or waging war can be of significant value in the termination of war. How war is brought to conclusion cannot be an afterthought.

Note that “naval presence” or “forward presence” is not included in this list. This is because forward presence is not a mission, it is a posture, a habit of operating. It unfortunately entered the pantheon of Navy missions in the mid-1970s in a famous essay by then Naval War College President Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner, and Navy leaders have tied themselves in knots ever since attempting to explain why “being there” is a mission, as if being there were an end unto itself. If the Navy could perform its Title 10 mission and associated tasks by surging from home ports when the nation’s interests were threatened, it should be made to do so. If the Navy could perform its Title 10 mission and associated tasks as a coastal and territorial waters defense force (or coast guard) when the nation’s interests were threatened, it should be made to do so. If the Navy could perform its Title 10 mission and associated tasks by occasionally sending forth cruising squadrons to “show the flag” when the nation’s interests were threatened, it should be made to do so. All of these operating postures offer the possibility of a smaller and more economical Navy due to vastly different (from today’s) fleet architectures. None of these alternative postures offer the prospect of mission accomplishment, and that is why forward presence is the preferred posture for the U.S. Navy.

Vulnerability of the Surface Force

Surface ships are vulnerable to a variety of enemy threats, including missiles, mines, and torpedoes. Adversary targeting methods and competence have improved, and it grows increasingly harder to “hide” surface ships — especially large surface ships — at sea. It is true that China’s vast buildup increases the vulnerability of the surface force in the Western Pacific, but this is an incomplete understanding of the dynamic.

First, everything on the modern battlefield has become more vulnerable. This does not mean those things are no longer valued. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated both the vulnerability and the value of heavy armor, and the same would be expected to apply to the surface force in the event of its wartime employment. How the fleet is operated influences its vulnerability, and the sea remains a difficult environment for precision targeting, especially against a competent Navy.

Second, vulnerability is a feature of conflict, after the shooting starts. Yet the Navy spends the overwhelming portion of its time not being shot at while it pursues the other functions and tasks derived from its Title 10 mission. The fleet must be capable enough to win in combat and large enough to conduct its global peacetime tasks. There is a tradeoff between the exquisite capabilities needed for the former and the mass/capacity of necessary for the former and the latter. Both must be resourced.
Next, for the United States to conduct its mission of conventional deterrence, it must have powerful, lethal, networked surface forces forward — again, not for the sake of being forward, but to demonstrate both the will and capability to deter. What in wartime contributes to vulnerability is, in peacetime, a vital contributor to deterrence: known, visible power on the horizon. There is no substitute for the certainty of response this force provides to the conventional deterrence posture. A serious threat to the surface force comes not from the Chinese navy but from American political leadership. Insufficient demand for ships caused the shipbuilding industry to shrink to the point where it is challenged to provide the peacetime needs of the Navy when the country needs to produce at a war footing. There is an “if you build it, they will come” aspect to growing the shipbuilding industrial base, and the first step is for political leadership to agree to a substantial naval buildup, one that workers with options can depend on, and that attracts new workers to critical trades. Pointing at the industrial base as the reason we cannot expand our Navy confuses cause and effect.

Needs of the Surface Force
It must grow. As indicated in the previous paragraph, the surface force must grow. The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan should commit to three large surface combatants a year, four small surface combatants a year, and a building rate sufficient to meet and maintain a fleet of 38 amphibious ships. The Navy and Marine Corps should continue to develop the landing ship medium class, but not at the expense of 38 large, capable amphibious ships.

It must be more lethal. There is no excuse for any ship of the surface force to be without offensive missiles capable of targeting other ships, targets ashore, or both. Whether through bolt-on expeditionary launchers or installed and integrated systems, amphibious ships and all littoral combat ships retained in service must become more lethal. By creating additional operational dilemmas for the adversary, each individual ship becomes less vulnerable. Those launchers (and the launchers already fielded) must be filled with increasingly more capable missiles, and more of those missiles must be acquired. Expeditionary reloading of any launching system we field cannot no longer be delayed. It must be more capable. The operational dilemmas posed by a more lethal surface force are increased when that surface force can employ its weapons at their maximum range. To do so, the surface force must have a capable organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform to replace its aging helicopter fleet, one that can find and fix targets hundreds of miles from the ship from which it launched. Finally, we must build on the legacy of excellence in the Aegis Weapon System by moving to the Navy’s Integrated Combat System, or ICS, an approach to command and control that ties individual ships together in a fighting network that provides in-stream battle management, weapons pairing and allocation and response options across the ensemble. It must evolve. We cannot build Arleigh Burke-class destroyers forever and continuing to avoid moving to the next-generation destroyer (DDG(X)) will preclude fielding of advanced weapons the fleet needs today. The Navy must propose, and the Congress ratify, a plan to move from building three Flight III DDG’s a year to three DDG(X)’s a year in the next decade. We must move faster in supplementing the current fleet with unmanned platforms that extend sensor coverage and magazine depth. And we must field a class of single-mission patrol boats built in numbers to employ surface-to-surface missiles in archipelagic seas. We can no longer aim for efficient peacetime production as the standard for acquisition; we must prepare for conflict and accept that there may be inefficiency involved.

Conclusion

This essay is timed for publication coincident to the January 2024 gathering of the Surface Navy Association in Arlington, Virginia, and is designed to encourage conversation and debate there and elsewhere. To this point, there is no evidence the alteration to the Title 10 mission of the Navy has had any impact on Department of Defense resource allocation, at least as can be discerned from the fiscal year 2024 DoD budget submission. It is for those interested in seapower — readers of this journal and members of the Navy League — to demand that our elected officials hold DoD and Navy officials accountable for fully implementing the Navy mission and resourcing accordingly. A strong, capable surface force is central to that mission, and there is considerable work to be done in achieving it.

Bryan McGrath is the Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group LLC defense consultancy. The views expressed in this essay are his.

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By CNO Public Affairs 

WASHINGTON (Jan. 9, 2023) – Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti released her priorities in a paper titled “America’s Warfighting Navy,” at the Surface Navy Association’s National Symposium, Jan. 9. 

The text of America’s Warfighting Navy reads as follows: 

Who We Are. We are the United States Navy, the most powerful navy in the world. We are the Sailors and Civilians who have answered our Nation’s call to service. We are Americans who embody character, competence, and dedication to our mission. Our identity is forged by the sea and we serve with honor, courage, and commitment. 

What We Do. We are here to preserve the peace, respond in crisis, and win decisively in war. We operate far forward, around the world and around the clock, from the seabed to space, in cyberspace, and in the information environment to promote our Nation’s prosperity and security, deter aggression, and provide options to our nation’s leaders. We deliver power for peace, but are always postured and ready to fight and win as part of the Joint Force and alongside our Allies and partners. 

Where We Are Going. The threats to our nation and our interests are real and growing. The strategic environment has changed; gone are the days of operating from a maritime sanctuary against competitors who cannot threaten us. The National Defense Strategy makes clear that we must defend our homeland, deter strategic attack, deter and be prepared to prevail in conflict against the People’s Republic of China, and meet the acute challenge of an aggressive Russia and other persistent threats. Our adversaries have designed their militaries to overcome our traditional sources of strength. We must move rapidly to stay ahead and continuously create warfighting advantages. We must think, act, and operate differently, leveraging wargaming and experimentation to integrate conventional capability with hybrid, unmanned, and disruptive technologies. Tomorrow’s battlefield will be incredibly challenging and complex. To win decisively in that environment, our Sailors must be the best warfighters in the world with the best systems, weapons, and platforms to ensure we can defeat our adversaries. We will put more players on the field—platforms that are ready with the right capabilities, weapons and sustainment, and people who are ready with the right skills, tools, training, and mindset. 

Our Priorities. We will focus on Warfighting, Warfighters, and the Foundation that supports them. 

Warfighting: Deliver Decisive Combat Power. We will view everything we do through a warfighting lens to ensure our Navy remains the world’s preeminent fighting force. We will prioritize the readiness and capabilities required to fight and win at sea, and the logistics and shore support required to keep our Navy fit to fight. We recognize that we will never fight alone. We will advance naval integration with the Marine Corps, and synchronize and align our warfighting efforts with the Joint Force. We will design and drive interoperability with our Allies and partners to deliver combined lethality. 

Warfighters: Strengthen the Navy Team. We will use the principles of mission command to empower leaders at all levels to operate in uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing environments, ready to take initiative and bold action with confidence. We will build strong warfighting teams, recruiting and retaining talented people from across the rich fabric of America. We will provide      world-class training and education to our Sailors and Civilians, honing their skills and giving them every opportunity to succeed. We will ensure our quality of service meets the highest standards, and we will look after our families and support networks, who enable us to accomplish our warfighting mission.  

Foundation: Build Trust, Align Resources, Be Ready. We will earn and reinforce the trust and confidence of the American People every day. We will work with Congress to field and maintain the world’s most powerful Navy and the infrastructure that sustains it. We will team with industry and academia to solve our most pressing challenges. We will cooperate with the interagency to bolster integrated deterrence. We will align what we do ashore with the warfighting needs of our Fleet. 

Our Charge. America is counting on us to deter aggression, defend our national security interests, and preserve our way of life. With the right tools, a winning mindset, and the highest levels of integrity, we will operate safely as a team to deliver warfighting excellence.  

I am proud to serve alongside you. I thank you and your families for your continued commitment to ensuring we are always ready. 

We have taken a fix and set our course. Together we will deliver the Navy the Nation Needs. The time is now to move with purpose and urgency: ALL AHEAD FLANK! 

America’s Warfighting Navy can be found online here. 

JAN. 9, 2024 

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III announced today that the president has made the following nominations: 

Navy Captain Douglas J. Adams for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Adams is currently serving as deputy, Program Executive Office, Undersea Warfare Systems, Washington, D.C.    

Navy Captain Todd F. Cimicata for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Cimicata is currently serving as chief of staff, Naval Air Forces/Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California.  

Navy Captain Frankie J. Clark for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Clark is currently serving as executive assistant to the commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 

Navy Captain David G. Duff for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Duff is currently serving as commanding officer, USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN 75), Norfolk, Virginia. 

Navy Captain Daniel W. Ettlich for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Ettlich is currently serving as fleet maintenance officer, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 

Navy Captain Todd M. Evans for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Evans is currently serving as vice commander, Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland. 

Navy Captain Todd A. Figanbaum for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half). Figanbaum is currently serving as director, Submarine Officer Career Management and Distribution Division (PERS-42), Navy Personnel Command, Millington, Tennessee. 

Navy Captain Bret M. Grabbe for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Grabbe is currently serving as chief of staff, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.  

Navy Captain Brian A. Harding for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Harding is currently serving as information warfare commander, Carrier Strike Group THREE, Bremerton, Washington. 

Navy Captain Jeffrey L. Heames for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Heames is currently serving as director, Surface Warfare Officer Career Management and Distribution Division (PERS-41), Navy Personnel Command, Millington, Tennessee. 

Navy Captain John W. Hewitt for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Hewitt is currently serving as chief of staff, Navy Installations Command, Washington, D.C. 

Navy Captain Liam M. Hulin for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Hulin is currently serving as commanding officer, U.S. Special Operations Command Forward, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. 
  
Navy Captain Marcos A. Jasso for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Jasso is currently serving as director, Maritime Operations Center, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 

Navy Captain Matthew J. Kawas for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Kawas is currently serving as principal military assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 
  
Navy Captain Justin A. Kubu for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Kubu is currently serving as commander, Amphibious Squadron SEVEN, San Diego, California.   

Navy Captain Robert E. Loughran Jr. for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Loughran is currently serving as branch head, Carrier Strike Aircraft and Weapons, N98, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C. 

Navy Captain Philip S. Miller for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Miller is currently serving as branch head, Carriers, N98, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C. 

Navy Captain Brian T. Mutty for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Mutty is currently serving as commanding officer, Surface Warfare Schools Command, Newport, Rhode Island. 

Navy Captain Tuan Nguyen for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Nguyen is currently serving as a maritime cooperation and competition director, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet, Yokosuka, Japan. 

Navy Captain Cassidy C. Norman for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Norman is currently serving as chief of staff, Naval Air Force Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia.  

Navy Captain Erin P. Osborne for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Osborne is currently serving as executive assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C. 

Navy Captain Bartley A. Randall for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Randall is currently serving as assistant deputy director for Global Operations, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 

Navy Captain Craig C. Sicola for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Sicola is currently serving as assistant chief of staff for Education, Training, and Planning, Naval Air Forces/Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California. 

Navy Captain Peter D. Small for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Small is currently serving as project manager, Program Executive Office, Attack Submarines, Washington, D.C. 

Navy Captain Melvin R. Smith Jr. for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Smith is currently serving as executive assistant to the commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.  

Navy Captain Vincent S. Tionquiao for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half).  Tionquiao is currently serving as director, Maritime Operations Center, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. TENTH Fleet, Fort Meade, Maryland. 

Release from BAE Systems 

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LOUISVILLE, Ky. — Jan. 8, 2024 — BAE Systems was awarded a contract by the Commonwealth of Australia to upgrade existing Mk 45 Mod 2 naval gun systems on Anzac class frigates with a Common Control System (CCS). The upgrade modifies existing Mk 45 systems to eliminate obsolescence issues and extend the life of the gun system.   

The CCS upgrade replaces electronics on earlier Mk 45 Mod 1 and Mod 2 gun systems to be compatible with the Mk 45 Mod 4, the latest configuration used by the U.S. Navy. In addition to delivering commonality and interoperability with the U.S. Navy’s gun systems, the upgrade will equip the Mk 45s with the capability to integrate future extended-range precision guided munitions, such as the hypervelocity projectile. 

“The Common Control System upgrade is the most cost-effective way to extend the life of Mk 45 gun systems, enabling them to provide critical ship naval fires and creating a configuration that allows for the integration of future precision guided munitions,” said Brent Butcher, vice president of weapon systems at BAE Systems. “We are committed to modernizing and equipping allied nations with enhanced Mk 45 gun systems to address current and future threats.” 

The cost-effective CCS upgrade ensures that Mk 45 gun systems remain supportable for decades to come and ready to integrate the latest, most innovative technology features to support advanced munitions and future mission capabilities for a significantly lower cost than a new gun.   

Work on the contract will take place at the BAE Systems production facility in Louisville, Kentucky with the first delivery planned in early 2026.  

ARLINGTON, Virginia ꟷ Shipbuilding giant HII had higher than usual growth through the third quarter of fiscal 2023, but a potential delay in contracting for two new aircraft carriers could lead to supply chain disruptions, the company CEO said in a media briefing on Jan. 8 in advance of the Surface Navy Association symposium this week.

“The company’s actually doing pretty great,” said CEO Christopher D. Kastner, who took over the company reins in March 2022. HII racked up 5% growth through Q3 of fiscal 2023, higher than its historical average of 3%.

“We’ve had a very solid 2023, we’ve grown at about 5% year-over-year through Q3, raised guidance on our top line for sales and free cash flow on our Q3 earnings call, so … we’re kind of at an inflection point from a growth standpoint,” he said.

Kastner said some company priorities appear to be supported in the pending fiscal 2024 defense authorization, including the LPD 33 amphibious warship. “Keeping the amphib line is very important to Ingalls” shipbuilding, Kastner said.

The company’s two shipyards have 41 ships in production and its Mission Technologies division, which builds and develops unmanned systems, AI systems and others, had more than $5 billion in awards during the year, including a $350 million contract for small unmanned underwater vehicles.

Seventeen submarines will go under contract in the next year to 18 months, and progress is being made on the AUKUS program to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines.

“We expect revenue to flow in 2024,” Kastner said. “We don’t believe it will be financially material in ’24, but there could be revenue flowing in ’24.”

Carrier Schedule

One potential fly in the ointment is the possibility of the next two-ship aircraft carrier buy being shifted by a year or two, from 2028 to 2029 or even 2030. In 2019, the Navy contracted for two carriers, CVN 80 and 81, the future Enterprise and Doris Miller.

“I think there’s a broad understanding that the supply chain is a material risk to achieving the production schedules on future Navy programs. And our job as shipbuilders is to manage risk,” Kastner said. “If we can eliminate one of those risks, or significantly reduce one of those risks by getting advanced procurement in place, well ahead of the ship being ordered, it only makes sense to do it. We know the ships are going to be built, they have broad support, so let’s eliminate risk, let’s get the major suppliers under contract early enough so they can plan and they can make their production schedules.”

A Newport News Shipbuilding executive, who asked not to be named, said the company is promoting a 2-3-4 concept for USS Gerald Ford-class aircraft carriers to create a “stable, predictable and consistent cadence within our industrial base.” That means a two-ship buy; at least three years of advanced procurement funding; and four-year build intervals between ships. “I believe the 2-3-4 strategy needs to be codified as the standard moving forward,” he said.

A delay in the procurement of CVN 82 is “extremely disappointing,” and could break the momentum of a rebuilding carrier production line “and have a detrimental impact on the entire nuclear shipbuilding industry, including submarine construction,” he said.

***** 

By VCNO Public Affairs 

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti welcomed Adm. James Kilby as the 43rd Vice Chief of Naval Operations in a ceremony at the Pentagon, Jan. 5.  

Kilby most recently served as the deputy commander, U.S. Fleet Forces in Norfolk, Virginia. He is a native of Pound Ridge, New York, and a 1986 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. He has commanded at unit and strike group levels and is the recipient of the Vice Adm. James B. Stockdale Award for inspirational leadership. 

“Adm. Kilby is an exceptional leader who is truly committed to our Sailors and meeting the needs of the Fleet,” said Franchetti. “His extensive operational experience combined with his deep requirements and force development expertise will help accelerate change across the force. I am thrilled to have him on board as we lead the Navy through this decisive decade, and I am grateful that he and his family continue to serve the Navy.” 

Kilby was promoted to the rank of admiral prior to the assumption of office. 

“I am honored and humbled to assume this position at such a critical time for our Navy and our nation,” said Kilby. “I am excited at the opportunity to support our CNO to ensure the Navy remains the most capable and powerful maritime force in the world.” 

His biography and photo can be found here: https://www.navy.mil/Leadership/Flag-Officer-Biographies/BioDisplay/Article/2236251/admiral-james-kilby/ 

By Richard R. Burgess, Senior Editor 

ARLINGTON, Va.—An uncrewed surface vessel (USV) was detonated in the international shipping lanes Jan. 4 in the latest attack launched from Yemen by Houthi rebels. 

“Fortunately, there were no casualties, and no ships were hit, but the introduction of a one-way attack USV is of concern,” said U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet and commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, and commander, Combined Maritime Forces, speaking to reporters in a June 4 teleconference. 

The attack was the 25th against merchant ships in the Red Sea since mid-November.  

In response to the attacks, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Dec. 18 launched Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational effort to protect shipping through the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. The Combined Maritime Forces under Commander, Task Force 153, are conducting the operation.  

Cooper said that the coalition forces had shot down 11 drones, two cruise missiles, and two antiship ballistic missiles launched from Yemen since the operation began. In addition, three of four Houthi attack boats, which fired on U.S. Navy helicopters, were then destroyed by U.S. Navy MH-60 helicopters from the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Gravely and the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower. 

Cooper said a total of 61 drones and missiles had been shot down by U.S. Navy destroyers and F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighters over the last two months. Other drones and missiles have been shot down by ships of the Royal Navy and French Navy. 

Cooper made three key points in the conference: 

“By number one, the number of nations participating has grown. Their contributions are meaningful, and our partners are doing great work at sea. Number two, about 1,500 merchant ships have safely transited the waters of the Red Sea since the operation began. And then number three, our collaboration with the maritime shipping industry has increased dramatically. We’re reassuring them through persistent communications that are characterized as two-way, both before and during transits, so that’s going well. 

“Now, having said this, the Houthi ruthless attacks have continued, as you know, and there are no signs their irresponsible behavior is abating,” he said.